## Variational Inequality and Complementarity Problems

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Dr.rer.nat. Zhengyu Wang

Nanjing University

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## Summary of Talk

- Source Problems
  - Optimization Problem
  - Free Boundary Problem
  - Equilibrium Problem

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- Algorithms
  - Josephy-Newton-Type Algorithm
  - Nonsmooth Newton Algorithms
  - Smoothing Algorithms

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#### The variational inequality problem

Given  $\Omega \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$  nonempty, and  $F : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}^n$ . The variational inequality problem, denoted by  $VIP(\Omega, F)$ , is to find a vector  $x^* \in \Omega$  such that

$$(y-x^*)^T F(x^*) \ge 0, \qquad \forall y \in \Omega.$$

## The nonlinear complementarity problem Given $F : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}^n$ . The nonlinear complementarity problem, denoted by NCP(f), is to find a vector $x^*$ such that

$$x^* \ge 0, \qquad F(x^*) \ge 0, \qquad x^{*T}F(x^*) = 0.$$

## Source Problems

#### Optimization Problem

Given  $\Omega \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$  nonempty, and  $f : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}$ . A minimization problem is to find a vector  $x^* \in \Omega$  such that for any  $x \in \Omega$  (or  $x \in \Omega \cap \mathcal{N}(x^*)$ ) it holds  $f(x^*) \leq f(x)$ , where  $\mathcal{N}(x^*)$  denotes a certain neighborhood of  $x^*$ . We call  $x^*$  a global (or local) minimizer of function f, and call  $f(x^*)$  a global (or local) minimum of f.

Notation:

 $\min f(x)$ 

S.t. 
$$x \in \Omega$$
.

## **Optimization Problem and VIP**

Let  $\Omega \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$  be nonempty and convex, let f:  $\mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}$  be differentiable and  $F(x) = \nabla f(x)$ .

- $x^*$  solves  $VIP(\Omega, F)$  if and only if there is no feasible decent direction at  $x^*$ .
- Furthermore, if f is pseudo-convex, then any solution of  $VIP(\Omega, F)$  is a global minimizer of f over  $\Omega$ .

#### Source Problems

#### - Free Boundary Problem

Find a function  $u(t,s): D \subseteq R^2 \to R$  such that

$$\begin{cases} \Delta u = \varphi(t, s, u, u'_t, u'_s) & \text{in } D_0 \\ \Delta u \leq \varphi(t, s, u, u'_t, u'_s) & \text{in } D_- \\ \Delta u \geq \varphi(t, s, u, u'_t, u'_s) & \text{in } D_+ \\ u = \psi(t, s) & \text{on } \partial D, \end{cases}$$

where the domains

$$D_{0} := \{(t,s) \in D : \underline{u} < u < \overline{u}\}$$
$$D_{-} := \{(t,s) \in D : u = \underline{u}\}$$
$$D_{+} := \{(t,s) \in D : u = \overline{u}\}$$
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are unknown.

## Free Boundary Problem and VIP – I

Let the free boundary problem have a unique solution u. How to approximate it ?

Impose square mesh

$$(t_m, s_l) = (mh, lh), \text{ where } \begin{cases} h = \frac{1}{k+1} \\ m, l = 1, \dots, k. \end{cases}$$

Find  $u_{m,l}$ ,  $m, l = 1, \ldots, k$  such that  $u(t_m, s_l) \simeq u_{m,l}$ .

## Free Boundary Problem and VIP – II

• Approximate 
$$\triangle u$$
 at  $(t_m, s_l)$  by:  

$$\frac{u_{m-1,l} + u_{m+1,l} + u_{m,l-1} + u_{m,l+1} - 4u_{m,l}}{h^2}.$$

• Approximate  $u'_t$  at  $(t_m, s_l)$  by:

$$\frac{u_{m+1,l}-u_{m-1,l}}{2h}.$$

• Approximate  $u'_s$  at  $(t_m, s_l)$  by:

$$\frac{u_{m,l+1}-u_{m,l-1}}{2h}.$$

## Free Boundary Problem and VIP – III

$$u = (u_{m,l}) \in \mathbb{R}^{k^2}$$
 is a solution of  $VIP(\Omega, F)$ ,

$$F_{m,l} := -u_{m-1,l} - u_{m+1,l} - u_{m,l-1} - u_{m,l+1} + 4u_{m,l}$$
$$+ h^2 \varphi(t_m, s_l, u_{m,l}, \frac{u_{m+1,l} - u_{m-1,l}}{2h}, \frac{u_{m,l+1} - u_{m,l-1}}{2h})$$

$$\Omega := \{ u = (u_{m,l}) | (\underline{u}(t_m, s_l)) \le u \le (\overline{u}(t_m, s_l)) \}$$

#### Source Problems

#### - Equilibrium Problem

Set of players:  $N = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ ,

Strategy vector:  $x_i \in R^{m_i}$ ,

Strategy set:  $X_i \subseteq R^{m_i}$ ,

Strategy space:  $X = \prod_{i \in N} X_i$ ,

Utility function:  $u_i: X \to R$ ,

Utility vector:  $u = (u_1, u_2, \dots, u_n)^T$ .

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#### Nash Equilibrium and VIP

A Nash equilibrium  $x^* \in X$  of the game NE(X, u)is defined as a point at which no player can unilaterally increase his utility, that is:

$$u_i(x_i^*, x_{N-\{i\}}^*) \ge u_i(x_i, x_{N-\{i\}}^*).$$

Let  $X_i$  be nonempty, closed and convex subset, and  $u_i : X \to R$  be once continuously differentiable and pseudo-concave w.r.t.  $x_i$  for all  $i \in N$ . Then  $x^*$  is a Nash equilibrium if and only if  $x^* \in X$  is a solution of VIP(X, F), where

$$F(x) = (F_i(x) : i \in N), \quad F_i(x) = -\partial u_i(x) / \partial x_i.$$

## • <u>Algorithms</u>

#### - Josephy-Newton-Type Algorithm - I

General Iterative Scheme:

Generate  $\{x^k\}_{k=0}^{\infty} \subset R^n$  such that

$$x^{k+1}$$
 solves  $VIP(\Omega, F^k)$ 

where

$$F^{k}(x) = F(x^{k}) + A(x^{k})(x - x^{k}).$$

## • Algorithms

#### Josephy-Newton-Type Algorithm – II

- D(x): diagonal part of F'(x)
- L(x): lower triangular part of F'(x)
- U(x): upper triangular part of F'(x)
- $\omega^*$ : a scalar parameter  $\in (0,2)$
- *G* : a fixed, symmetric, positive definite matrix

Josephy-Newton-Type Algorithm – III

Frequently Used Algorithms:

(a) Josephy-Newton Algorithm

$$A(x^k) = F'(x^k)$$

(b) Quasi-Newton Algorithm  $A(x^k) \simeq F'(x^k)$ 

(c) Projection Algorithm  $A(x^k) = G$ 

## Algorithms

– Josephy-Newton-Type Algorithm – IV

Other Algorithms:

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(d) Successive Overrelaxation Algorithm (SOR)  $A(x^{k}) = \begin{cases} L(x^{k}) + D(x^{k})/\omega^{*} \\ U(x^{k}) + D(x^{k})/\omega^{*} \end{cases}$ (e) Symmetrized Newton Algorithm  $A(x^{k}) = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{k}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{k}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \right) \right) \left( \frac{k}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{k}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \right) \right)$ 

$$A(x^{k}) = \frac{1}{2}(F'(x^{k}) + F'(x^{k})^{T})$$

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## • Algorithms

#### Josephy-Newton-Type Algorithm – V

#### Merit Function

Function  $\theta : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}_+$  is a merit function provided that  $\theta(x^*) = 0$  if and only if  $x^*$  solves  $VIP(\Omega, F)$ .

Linear Search

Given  $x^k$ . Compute  $\tilde{x}^{k+1}$  such that  $\tilde{x}^{k+1}$  solves  $VIP(\Omega, F^k)$ . Set  $d^k := \tilde{x}^{k+1} - x^k$ . Find  $\lambda^k$  such that  $\theta(x^k + \lambda^k d^k) = \min_{\lambda \in (0,\bar{\lambda})} \theta(x^k + \lambda d^k)$ . Set

$$x^{k+1} := x^k + \lambda^k d^k.$$

## **Equation Reformulation**

Find  $H : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}^n$  such that  $x^*$  solves  $VIP(\Omega, F)$  if and only if

$$H(x) = 0$$

$$\uparrow$$
Usually Nonsmooth

• 
$$H(x) = x - Pr_{\Omega,G}(x - G^{-1}F(x))$$

• 
$$H(x) = \min\{x - L, x - U, F(x)\}$$
, when  

$$\Omega = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^n | L \le x \le U\}$$

• 
$$H(x) = \min\{x, F(x)\} = 0$$
 when  $\Omega = \mathbb{R}^n_+$ .

## Algorithms

#### - Nonsmooth Newton Algorithms

Given 
$$x^k \in \mathbb{R}^n$$
. Generate  $\{x^k\}_{k=0}^{\infty}$  such that  $x^{k+1} := x^k - A(x^k)^{-1}H(x^k)$ ,

where

$$A(x^k) \in \partial H(x^k).$$
  
 $\uparrow$ 
  
Generalized Jacobian

$$\partial H(x) := \overline{co} \{ J = \lim_{m \to \infty} G'(y^m) \}$$

where  $y^m \to x$ , H is differentiable at each  $y^m$ .

#### **Homotopy Reformulation**

Find  $H(s,x) : R \times R^n \to R^n$  such that  $x^*$  solves  $VIP(\Omega, F)$  if and only if

 $\begin{array}{c} H(0,x)=0\\ \uparrow\\ \\ \text{Usually Nonsmooth} \end{array}$ 

H(s,x) differentiable when  $s \neq 0$ .

Example for NCP(F) $H(s,x) = (\sqrt{x_i^2 + F_i(x)^2 + s} - (x_i + F_i(x)))$  <u>Algorithms</u>

Choose  $\{s_{\kappa}\} \subseteq R_{++}$  such that  $s_{\kappa} \downarrow 0$ . Compute an approximate solution  $x^{\kappa,n_{\kappa}}$  of

$$H(s_{\kappa}, x) = 0.$$

Starting from  $x^{\kappa,n_\kappa}$ , an approximate solution  $x^{\kappa+1,n_{\kappa+1}}$  of

$$H(s_{\kappa+1}, x) = 0.$$

Obtain a sequence  $\{x^{\kappa,n_{\kappa}}\}_{\kappa=0}^{\infty} \to x^*$ .

#### <u>Software</u>

 PATH ftp://ftp.cs.wisc.edu/math-prog /solvers/path/matlab/

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## **Literature**

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# Thank You All !